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Preface 
We aim to persuade you to adopt a liberal view of contract law. To achieve 
this goal, this book offers choice theory, an approach that departs ti·om con-
temporary accounts in two ways: it analyzes the field as a whole and puts 
freedom back into "freedom of contract." 
* * * 
Our first departure is to explore contract as a whole, not just the narrow 
commercial issues that are of primary scholarly concern today. For millennia, 
contract law has been organized around a diverse array of off-the-shelf solu-
tions for many of life's pressing contractual challenges - that is, around 
contract types for family, work, and home, along with commerce. 
But then, in the late 18oos, classical legal thought in America began shifting 
contract's terrain. The transition culminated in the 1920s with Samuel Will-
iston's multivolume treatise, The Law of Contracts- a work that still shapes the 
everyday law. Williston's goal was to unifY a body oflaw whose fragmentation, 
in his view, obscured the field's basic principles. The result of his project was 
to give pride of place to commercial contracts, and as a by-product, render 
peripheral the diversity of other contract types. 
Williston replaced the unprincipled multiplicity of the common law (and 
European civil law) with the unprincipled uniformity that dominates Ameri-
can contract law today. This shift had an une:x:pected implication: if contracts 
are for commerce, then the law should maximize utility, a goal understood 
primarily in terms of material benefits. Competing values like autonomy and 
community could be ignored because they came to be seen as outside 
the field. 
But what if the values contracting parties actually care about are in conflict? 
It's here that the now-conventional scope of the field (the Willistonian project) 
XI 
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and the now-dominant method of inquiry (efficiency analysis) fall short. 
Utility matters, but it is not the sole, or even the dominant, value people seek 
when contracting. 
Despite Williston's success in reshaping the field , existing contract law still 
offers types that vary widely in their normative struchues: some are indeed 
organized to promote utility, others to enhance community, but most aim to 
achieve a mix of these values. In large measure, what ensures contractual 
autonomy is people's continuing ability to choose from among diverse types 
within each important sphere of human interaction. Based on this descriptive 
reality, and the normative imperatives it suggests, we renew the focus on 
contract types and, in so doing, reject \Villiston's answer to the question, 
"\Vhat is contract?" 
Our second departure is to offer a rigorous normative account of contract 
types. Freedom comes first. Ours is a liberal account that takes seriously 
contract's role in enhancing autonomy. 
We are not the first on this path. Charles Fried, in his 1981 volume Contract 
as Promise, recovered autonomy as the moral core of contract. Departing from 
Williston's unprincipled unifonnity, Fried aimed at principled tmi{om1ity. 
Fried argued correctly that autonomy matters centrally to contract - in this, 
he made an enduring contribution. But his specific arguments faltered 
because he missed the role of diverse contract types and because he grounded 
contractual freedom in a flawed, rights-based view. Despite decades of effort 
by Fried and by later liberal theorists, we can now say all rights-based argu-
ments for contractual autonomy have failed . 
This failure has high costs: if freedom drops away as a justification for 
contract, then what's left, mostly, is the efficiency approach. But a thorough-
going efficiency theory of contract has never been persuasive. Other values 
cannot be banished altogether if, for example, you oppose slavery and endorse 
marriage. The challenge is to offer a normatively appealing way to situate 
efficiency analysis within a liberal framework. The first step in that project is to 
reject Fried's answer to the question, "What is freedom?" 
* ~c * 
We offer this book as a counterpoint to Williston and Fried. Choice themy 
shows how contract law can enhance individual autonomy while, at the same 
time, providing the economic and social benefits people seek in working 
together. Our approach returns analysis to the mainstream of twentieth-
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century liberalism - a tradition concerned with enhancing self-determination 
that is mostly absent in contract the01y today. By showing how this tradition 
applies to contract law as a whole, choice theory moves from the principled 
unifonnity that Fried attempted to the principled multiplicity that liberalism 
requires. 
While not (yet) a restatement of contract law, choice theory offers numer-
ous appealing doctrinal refinements and solves many long-standing puzzles in 
contract law and theory. It provides efficiency analysts of contract a more 
secure normative grounding for their work. And it offers teachers and students 
of contract law, for the first time, a coherent nonnative vocabulaty that makes 
sense of the casebook canon. Choice theory shows why and how freedom 
matters to contract. 
Introduction 
CHOICE THEORY 
As free people, we do not live each on our own island, isolated in perfect 
independence . We want and need each other to achieve life's worthy goals. 
Contract law provides a powerful means to achieve these goals. Through 
contract, we can recruit others to help write the stories of our lives . 
There's a catch, however. Contracts require enforcement; enforcement 
entails coercion; and coercion seems at odds with freedom. So, is "freedom 
of contract" possible? Yes, the state can respect, indeed enhance, our auton-
omy even when it enforces our contracts . However, the truth of this propos-
ition is not self-evident. The aim of this book is to show how a robust 
commitment to freedom justifies and shapes contract law in a liberal polity. 
We start from the mainstream liberal tradition of the past century, that is, 
with concern for individual autonomy - with self-detem1ination, with self-
authorship, with ensuring to us, as individuals, the ability to write and re-write 
the story of our own lives. This deep and widely-shared sense of what it means 
to be free - the liberalism of Isaiah Berlin, H.L.A. Hart, and John Rawls -
rightly dominates the most impmtant political, legal, and philosophical debates. 
Surprisingly, however, this approach has gone missing in recent generations 
of work on private law in general and contract law specifically. Other notions 
of contractual autonomy - say Kantian and libe1tarian ideas of personal 
independence- now have a powe1ful hold on the field. But they all necessar-
ily fail for reasons we detail in Chapters 1 tluough 3· Similarly, foundational 
alternatives for liberalism itself, such as political liberalism, are not adequate 
to justify contract law, as we explain in Chapter 8, where we answer many 
objections to our theory. 
We call our approach tl1e choice themy of contract. In this view, the state 
enforces contracts not just to make society as a whole better off- that's the 
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efficiency rationale- but even more fundamentally to enhance people's auton-
omy so that they can make their lives meaningfully their own. Much of our task 
is to persuade you that any contract theory worthy of being called liberal must 
concern itself with autonomy defined in this sense, as self-determination. 
Choice themy answers the most important questions of contract theory: 
What is the "freedom" celebrated in "freedom of contract"? How are individ-
uals freer when the state coerces contract performance? What core values 
should contract law advance and how do those values inter-relate? Must the 
state take an active role in shaping conh·act law? If so, what is that role? 
Existing approaches have failed to answer these fundamental questions. 
One observer goes so far as to say that "today there is no generally recognized 
theory of contract. The effort to develop a coherent explanation of contract 
seems to have reached an impasse. 711 There is no impasse. A doctrinally well-
fit, conceptually coherent, and normatively attractive account of contract is in 
view. Choice theory starts with the most appealing, least controversial tenets of 
modem liberalism and ends with their implications for contract law. 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS 
The main tool that choice theory uses to point the way forward is an organizing 
framework we call "freedom of contracts." We would like to claim the ubiqui-
tous phrase "freedom of contract" - without the "s" - but we leave the term 
aside because of its confounding negative liberty and laissez faire associations. 
"Freedom of contracts" sums up the three irreducible elements necessary to 
contractual autonomy: (1) an overarching voluntariness principle, sometimes 
called freedom from contract; (2) the familiar freedom to bargain foi- terms 
within a contract; and (3) the long-neglected freedom to choose from among 
contract types. As we will show, attention to the third element- choice among 
types - is the key that can set conh·act theory on a sustainably liberal path. 
We agree that the first element, voluntariness, is an essential aspect of free 
contracting, with a twist we'll get to in Chapter 8. Also, we acknowledge that 
the second component, bargaining for terms within a contract, is a nontrivial 
aspect of contracting. It's the overwhelming focus of current the01y. At times, 
people really do want their own idiosyncratic deal and they need the law to do 
no more than enforce their joint agreement. 
But bargaining for tenns is not the dominant mode of contracting, and it 
should not determine, as it long has, the central meaning of contractual 
autonomy. Usually, when people voluntarily enter contracts, they are not 
designing their deal from scratch. For most of us, most of the time - if we 
get married, start a new job, or click "I accept" - contractual freedom means 
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the ability to choose from among a sufficient range of off-the-shelf, norma-
tively attractive contract types and then, perhaps, make a few contextual 
adjustments within the deal. In large measure, freedom means pursuing the 
valuable ends of our lives, not spending our resources dickering over contract 
terms and wonying whether others are taking advantage of us. 
In other words, the mainstay of present-day contracting is the choice among 
types. By "types," we do not mean standard-form contracts or boilerplate terms 
as such. Forms or terms may reflect the parties' choice of a particular type (say, 
a franchise agreement); they may push a type in a certain direction (say, a 
landlord-provided lease), or they may point toward emergence of a new type 
(such as a cohabitation agreement). But standard forms and terms are not 
themselves types. They are particular instances of the types of relationships 
people contractually create, whether franchise or agency, commercial or 
residential lease, cohabitation or marriage. 
Each type uses distinctive doctrinal features embedded in the law - not just 
in form contracts or boilerplate terms - to embody that type's particular 
normative concerns and stabilize its shared cultural meaning. To give just a 
few examples, consider doctrines such as waiting periods to dissolve marriage 
contracts, limitations on enforcement of employee noncompete agreements, 
and generous return rules in consumer transactions. From the perspective of 
most contract themy today - focused on freedom to bargain for terms inside a 
contract - such doctrinal rules may seem to be exceptions from a general 
norm, oddities needing rationalization, or even worse, they may be framed 
simply as limits on contractual freedom to be discarded. 
By contrast, choice theory suggests that each of these doctrines, and many 
others, may be better understood as clues to and reflections of the divergent 
normative concerns of a particular contract type. By stabilizing their respective 
types, by making them more available and attractive to contracting pa1ties, and 
by making available distinct choices about the structure of important relation-
ships, such doctrinal rules can enhance contractual freedom. 
Attention to the actually existing choice among types opens the door to a 
liberal and general theory of contract law. Let's introduce those three com-
ponents in turn. 
A LIBERAL THEORY 
To qualify as liberal, contract theory must be grounded in an appealing 
conception of contractual "autonomy" - or "freedom" or "liberty" (we use 
these terms interchangeably for reasons that will become apparent by the end 
of Chapter 4). The problem is that contractual autonomy is not self-defining. 
4 lntroducti on 
Just the opposite. Pinning it down is tough, much tougher than the concept's 
easy intuitive appeal suggests. 2 
1. Autonomy through Choice . The first theoretical aspiration of choice theory is 
to offer a liberal conception of contractual autonomy grounded in, and well-
adapted to, the actual diversity of contract types. One element of this auton-
omy- reflecting the usual meaning of freedom of contract- involves support-
ing individuals as they pursue their own idiosyncratic deals. But contract law 
must do more if it is to expand meaningful choices in service of autonomy. It 
must also support freedom to choose from among diverse, normatively attractive 
contract types in each important area of human interaction. Free people are 
defined in part by the attractive choices they reject, not just those they select. 
The implications of this claim are stark. It is here that choice theory offers 
its single most important and distinctive normative payoff: a state committed to 
human freedom must be proactive in shaping contract law, including ensur-
ing availability of a diverse body of normatively attractive types. This commit-
ment means that the state is sometimes obligated to support establishment of 
emerging types that setve minoritarian or utopian values - even when market 
demand for the new types is low. This suppmt can take the form of enforcing 
novel contract types (say, judicially created cohabitation doctrines or privately 
drafted commercial surrogacy contracts) or removing legislative and regulatory 
hurdles to emerging contract types (such as Canada's "dependent contract-
ors"). We illustrate this process in Chapter 11, and then, in Chapter 12, we 
explore some countervailing limits to expanding choice - based on cognitive, 
behavioral, structural, and political economy grounds and in response to 
concerns about comparative institutional competence. 
2. Mandatory Rules and Autonomy. As a corollary to supporting new types, 
sometimes the state must also restrict choice within types. By stabilizing and 
channeling cultural expectations regarding types, such restrictions may be 
necessary to make them effective. This last point suggests a surprising payoff 
of choice theory: sticky defaults and even mandatory terms within a contract 
type can actually increase freedom, so long as - and this is crucial - law offers 
sufficient choice among types, a claim we justify and refine in Chapter 10. 
A GENERAL THEORY 
The second conceptual component of choice theory is to show how a liberal 
contract theory can also be a general one. To qualify as general, a theory must 
address the varied goods and diverse spheres of contracting. 
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1. Intra-Sphere Multiplicity. Accordingly, we reject the notion that any single 
value - utility, community, or even autonomy - suffices for a coherent 
general theory. Instead, we relocate most of the normative (and doctrinal) 
discussion to a more correct and productive level - relating to the diverse 
values that animate each type and the recurring dilemmas common to 
each sphere. For now, it suffices to note that by "sphere," we mean a core 
realm of human interaction in which contract law can enrich how individuals 
legitimately enlist others to their projects. The particular taxonomy of spheres 
we develop in Chapter 9 is wholly instmmental to this end of ensuring 
adequate choice among types. (Chapter 10 pins down "types," including 
how we know when a new "type" has emerged and when the range of types 
. " d t ") IS a equa e. 
It should be no surprise that the values plausibly animating marriage, 
employment, and consumer transactions differ from each other and from 
those driving commercial transactions, and further that, the contract types 
within a single sphere offer individuals choices among divergent values. 
Indeed, the core requirement of choice theory is the availability of norma-
tively attractive types with distinct value mixes that can serve as effective 
substitutes within each sphere -what we call intra-sphere multiplicity. 
2. Freedom for Economists . One collateral benefit of this approach - and a 
major impetus for this book - is to offer efficiency-oriented contract scholars 
a more secure and defensible normative grounding for their work. Much of 
contract law is, and should be, driven by efficiency concerns. But a thorough-
going efficiency theory of contract has never been persuasive. Autonomy and 
community concerns cannot be banished altogether if, for example, you 
oppose slavery and endorse marriage. So, how do these normative commit-
ments interrelate? 
Choice theory solves this puzzle. It shows how contract law can enhance 
individual autonomy while at the same time providing people with the 
economic and social benefits they seek. Thus, we recognize autonomy as 
contract law's ultimate value, as set out in Chapters 4 and 7· At the same time, 
we note that people usually do not enter into specific contracts to become 
freer. Sometimes, people contract to achieve "utility," as framed in Chapter 5· 
Other times, they seek "community" - the somewhat clunky term we define 
in Chapter 6 to encompass the social benefits of contracting, as distinct from 
utilitarian ones. Contrach1al autonomy operates primarily, but not entirely, to 
ensure that people can make effective choices among these values when they 
so choose. 
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For efficiency theorists, we offer a path back from the uncomfortable 
collectivist position implied by an exclusive focus on maximizing social 
welfare, and we give them a normatively appealing way to situate effi-
ciency analysis within a liberal framework. Most efficiency theori~ts care 
about freedom, but they haven't had a compelling way to incorporate that 
concern into their models besides some hand-waving in its general 
direction. 
We show the way: efficiency theorists must, at the least, adopt as friendly 
amendments five theoretical points in Chapter 8 and consider a somewhat 
larger number of novel doctrinal refmms sprinkled throughout the book and 
collected in the Conclusion. In short, freedom has a price. 
A THEORY OF LAW 
Finally, to qualify as a liberal and general themy of law, we consider seriously 
the distinctive reform program of choice theory. It boils down to two compon-
ents: first, a liberal state is obligated to ensure intra-sphere multiplicity; second, 
the meaning of trans-substantive or "general" contract law concepts should 
vary according to the "local" animating principles of particular contract types. 
We consider these in turn: 
1. The State's Affinnative Role. Prior autonomy-based theories have conflated 
ideal contract law with legal passivity, that is, with the commitment that law 
aim just to enforce the parties' wills and maybe cure discrete market failures . 
By contrast, choice themy shows why a state committed to human freedom 
must actively enable people's relationships by shaping distinct contract types. 
Contract law has a crucial role to play in delivering on the liberal promise of 
freedom. The state may betray this autonomy-enhancing mission not only by 
having bad law or too much law; law's absence may undermine it just as welP 
Put more sharply, choice theory shows that liberal states are affirmatively 
obligated to ensure an adequate range of contract types in each important 
sphere of human interaction - subject to concerns about comparative insti-
tutional competence discussed in Chapter 12. 
Choice theory is at its strongest in analyzing new and emerging contract 
types- in areas as diverse as gestational surrogacy, employment in the sharing 
economy, and the partnership structure of law firms. While the market for 
contractual innovation is vibrant, particularly in the commercial sphere, there 
is no reason to believe that existing types either exhaust the variety of goods 
that people seek by contracting or are best configured to support their diver-
gent goals. 
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2. "Local" Contract Law. A second implication of choice theory is to chal-
lenge the idea that "general" contract law principles should have a universal 
meaning across contract law.4 The seeming incoherence of this view, which 
advocates multiplicity in the name of one underlying commitment to auton-
omy, dissolves once we appreciate its reliance on a familiar, autonomy-based 
commitment to pluralism. Our method has the virtue of providing a textured 
way to evaluate the fine doctrinal details of contract law, as we discuss in the 
back half of the book. 
We show that the application of familiar contract concepts- including, for 
example, liquidated damages, efficient breach, and the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing - should vary depending on the normative concerns driving 
different contract types. Even voluntariness, the most trans-substantive con-
tract concern, should be understood differently in different types, and the 
doctrinal tools used to protect this concern should vary accordingly. Further, 
we show how universal application of "general" contract law doctrines has led 
to doctrinal confusion in long-standing contract types. We give examples of 
how choice theory can improve our understanding of, for example, the law 
of agency, bailments, consumer transactions, fiduciaries , and suretyship- the 
ABCs of traditional, pre-Willistonian contract law. 
A consistent commitment to autonomy as the normative foundation of 
contract implies that doctrinal interpretation and evaluation should, by and 
large, look to the "local" animating principles of existing contract types rather 
than to any "core" principle of contract law. While this stance may seem novel 
to some American contract theorists, it can be understood as a principled 
analogue to the ordinary, taxonomic civil law approach in which "the classifi-
cation of the contract as a particular type[ ,] generates a set of abstract expect-
ations as to what is central to that contract."5 
CONTRACTS AS A WHOLE 
It should be apparent already that choice themy makes two substantial depart-
ures from contemporary approaches to contract. As noted in the Preface, we 
are interested in the field as a whole and we take seriously the centrality of 
freedom to contract. A few more words on these departures may be helpful. 
1. The Willistonian Constraint. In our view, contract theory seems to have 
reached "an impasse" primarily because the field of study has been so 
artificially constrained. If you ask theorists about marriage or surrogacy 
contract types, many answer: that's family law, not contracts. How about 
new forms of worker contracts? That's employment or labor law. Consumer 
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transactions? They're part of the regulatory state. Rather than embracing 
diverse types, contract theory has shrunk its focus to certain commercial 
transactions. 
This conceptual shrinkage represents an ahistorical and misleading view of 
contract.6 From Roman times nearly to the present, contract law was built on 
an appreciation of the role of existing and emerging contract types. Ancient 
Roman law .jtself was marked by a divide between "nominate" contracts 
(contract types) and "innominate" contracts (freestanding bargains), a distinc-
tion that persists in European civil law systems? For example, German law 
today offers a taxonomy of "typical" contract types, each with its own tailored 
doctrines; it has methods for shunting analysis of "hybrid" or "mixed" con-
tracts through the existing types; and it deploys recognition mechanisms for 
"atypical," "customary," and "new" types.8 By contrast, contract theory in 
America has lost sight of this deep structure. 
The story of how contract was transformed in America is beyond our scope 
here. It is enough to mention that this process shifted contract theory from 
concern with distinctive types to a trans-substantive, stylized, and seemingly 
universal approach. The transition began with the work of Christopher 
Columbus Langdell in the late 18oos, was crystalized in Samuel Williston's 
1920 treatise The Law of Contracts, and was fully cemented in the 1932 First 
Restatement of Contracts (with Williston as Reporter).9 Perhaps because of 
his abiding concern with creating a national, uniform legal architecture for 
commerce, Williston made many actual contracting practices seem periph-
eral - or outside of contract law altogether. This distinctive, early twentieth- , 
century American trajectory elevated commercial transactions to the core of 
contract, and, as a byproduct, substantially obscured the generative role of 
diverse contract types. 
Wil1iston's aspiration to transcend contract types with "general " law is 
understandable and indeed laudable (especially if reframed as the "residual 
categmy of freestanding contracting" that we suggest in Chapter 8). But 
lawyers cannot rely on "general" contract law to engage with the key elements 
of employment, family, or other ordinary types of contract - even if the law 
were redesigned as we recommend. To rely on any general view would often 
constitute malpractice.10 And yet, contract theory today is dominated by the 
notion of general contract law and is structured around the specific, not very 
representative, sphere of commercial contracting. 
So, in brief, the first substantial departure for choice theory is to push back 
against the Willistonian notion that the core of contracting is dickering over 
terms within a commercial deal. Such transactions are surely important, but 
they are not the platonic type of any contracting sphere, not even- as it turns 
Introduction 
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out - in a world of commerce, a world that has been increasingly affected by 
collaborative contracting, shategic alliances, and business networks, among 
many other innovative practices. While we are not the first to note the 
overlooked role of contract types - relational theorists following Karl Llewel-
lyn's lead have also resisted the Willistonian move"- we are the first to offer a 
normative account that connects the multiplicity of types with its role in 
enhancing freedom. 
2. Teaching Contract Law. Unfortunately, contract law teaching has 
followed Williston 's commercial law push . The leading casebooks through 
which American law students learn contracts are all organized along trans-
substantive lines and marginalize many noncommercial contracting prac-
tices from their explanatmy field.' 2 Each presents Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, Jacob 6 Youngs v. Kent, 
Hadley v. Baxendale, Taylor v. Caldwell, and the same few dozen prima1y 
teaching cases (with minor variations) to drive home a Willistonian agenda 
supported by a thin utilitarian scaffolding. By our count, the strong majority 
of the roughly 1200 excerpted cases in the top six casebooks have a 
commercial focus .'3 No book contains even a single chapter devoted to 
noncommercial contract types and none offers a coherent framework for 
analyzing what is distinctive about contracting in the spheres of work, 
home, or intimacy.'4 
Wisps of conceptual and normative concern appear sporadically when the 
books note "deviations" from a trans-substantive application of concepts such 
as promissmy estoppel, unconscionability, consideration, specific perform-
ance, or misrepresentation.' 5 These deviations appear mostly as instances of 
judicial application of ''public policy" or equitable powers in noncommercial 
contexts- in contrast to the vast majority of excerpted cases decided "at law" 
and used to illustrate rule-based, commercially oriented, trans-substantive 
principles. 
It's a mistake, though, to say that cases decided on public policy or equity 
grounds are outliers from a coherent core. Public policy and equity tap into 
tlueads of contract law as deep as tl1ose decided at law. The challenge for 
students is that the casebooks do not offer them (or their professors) any 
coherent vocabulary for talking through what principles might animate public 
policy or equity. Are these concepts tlueaded coherently through contract law 
or are they just an ad hoc grab bag? When should we apply which principle? 
In addition, the "general" law taught to 1Ls gives them no purchase on the 
diverse family, work, home, and consumer contract types they encounter in 
upper-level "contracts" classes and later in legal practice. Students begin their 
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careers without a language for thinking through why contract law appears as it 
does and without tools for arguing how it should be shaped going fmward -
other than some undeveloped utilitarian commitments. 
It may be worth noting that contract is a private law outlier. Other private 
law fields have not gone through quite the same flattening process. For 
example, property still focuses on recurring dilemmas of distinctive property 
types - that is, conveyancing, leasing, servitudes, co-ownership, and intellec-
tual propelty - and the palticular normative concerns underlying each of 
these property institutions. Totts, too, still retains some of the lumpy quality of 
pre-Williston contracts (notwithstanding the exaggerated teaching focus today 
on negligence). 
The first-year contract law curriculum represents Williston's greatest vic-
tory. To the extent this book has a pedagogical purpose, it is to shift the 
conceptual framework and normative language that students - and later 
la\!1-yers, judges, and scholars - bring to analyzing contract in America. To 
start, we reject Williston's answer to the question, "what is contract?" 
THE NATURE OF CONTRACTUAL FREEDOM 
Our second departure concerns the nature of contractual freedom. This is not 
a new problem. Some liberal contract theorists - notably Charles Fried in 
Contract as Promise - take Kant as their starting point. Others start with a 
libettarian philosopher like Robett Nozick. Depending on which aspect of 
freedom they celebrate, liberal theorists have given the resulting approaches 
names such as "promise theory," "transfer theory," and "consent theory." All 
these modern theories share a crucial element: they answer the question 
"what is freedom?" with a rights-based (or deontological) view of contract that 
excludes consequentialist (or teleological) elements. 
While these theories make many useful contributions, as a group, they 
have reached a dead end. This is not to condemn deontological theories of 
private law in general. It may be possible, for example, to construct a persua-
sive deontological approach to tort law. Our claim is more targeted: despite 
several decades of sustained effort, rights-based theories of contractual auton-
omy, and the ambitious reform programs they advance, have failed. It is time 
to move on. 
The crucial wrong turn of existing liberal contract theories is to associate 
the phrase "freedom of contract" with negative liberty or personal independ-
ence, that is, with the idea that contract law should enforce whatever private 
deals individuals agree to and othetwise get out of the way. In large measure, 
this view is the philosophical counterpoint to the Willistonian project - and 
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indeed Williston himself advocated such a stance. 16 If contract centrally 
concerns sophisticated business dealings, then a negative liberty view is 
neither surprising nor entirely unjustifiable. 
But this narrow justification has spread beyond the commercial context. It 
has become a commitment "fundamental in the orthodox understanding of 
contract law, that the content of a contractual obligation is a matter for the 
parties, not the law.m7 The strongest version of this claim comes from the legal 
economist Richard Craswell, who writes that contractual freedom "has very 
little to do" with contract law and is thus perceived as "largely irrelevant" to its 
design.18 In this view, "freedom of contract" more or less devolves into an 
essentially hands-off stance for the state, a view that misses much of how 
contract law can, should, and actually does secure freedom. 19 
Existing liberal contract theories may fit well with limited aspects of com-
mercial contracting, but they fail when expanded to cover contract law as a 
whole. People want, and the law has always offered, much more than just 
a negative liberty version of contract. Descriptively, then, existing liberal 
theories miss the texture of why we contract with one another; conceptually, 
they overlook key features of contractual autonomy; normatively, they slight 
the diverse goods of contracting. 
The conventional liberal view is bad theory. Bad theory is costly, and not 
just in theory. Together with the Willistonian project, the negative liberty view 
has helped splinter contract into disparate and noncommunicating fields. For 
example, many scholars of work and family define their fields as distinct from, 
and even in opposition to, contract law. In so doing, they are often trying to 
shield their contract types from what they see as the troublesome implications 
of the negative liberty view.2 0 But they, and we, pay a high price. We all miss 
the reform payoffs that come from appreciating the autonomy-enhancing 
potential of contract in employment, labor, and family law and from lever-
aging insights arising across the whole of contracting practice. 
Another cost of the negativ:e liberty view is subtler. After employment law, 
labor law, family law, and other core fields flee, what's left in contract law 
today is mostly the law of commercial transactions. Current liberal theories 
do not have much that is persuasive to say about business law. Even Fried, in 
his recent work, finds that his liberal theory substantially dissolves into 
familiar efficiency reforms. 21 To the extent individuals want their sophisti-
cated business contracts to be primarily wealth-maximizing, efficiency analy-
sis should, for the most part, dominate discussion and liberal contract reforms 
should have little traction. 
Conversely, efficiency theorists understand that efficiency cannot be their 
only metric, even for business law. But adopting any of the current liberal 
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theories - with their muddled conceptual apparatuses and unpersuasive 
normative programs - would exact too high a price. So, efficiency theorists 
may say freedom "jumpstarts" contract or plays some other minimal role, but 
liberal values mostly reside outside their models. The turn by efficiency 
analysis of contract away from liberal principles is costly and premature, both 
for their own work and for the law's development. 
While existing liberal theories of contractual freedom all fail , that does not 
mean we have to give up on freedom. The mainstream liberal view of auton-
omy (as self-determination) remains available, and properly understood, it 
provides a secure justification for contract law. Choice themy plays nicely with 
efficiency analysis - it puts freedom back into the equation. 
THREE METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
Before we hit the road, three methodological comments are in order regarding 
the nature of our themy and its precise subject matter and limits. The first 
concerns interpretation, the second focuses on the difference between cat-
egories for deciding and thinking, and the final addresses the path from theory 
to practice . 
1. On Interpretation. We view our approach as an interpretation of existing 
contract law in liberal societies, one that crafts a theoretical framework for its 
doctrines that presents them in their best light. An "interpretive theory" of law, 
like ours, is aimed not at discovering the original intentions of lawmakers, nor 
at analyzing law's historical evolution. It is not intended to uproot existing 
practices, nor to supplant law with wholly innovative ways of organizing society. 
Rather, an interpretative theory is situated between discovery and inven-
tion.22 It builds on existing practices and thus reaffirms much of existing law. 
But it provides an account of these practices that suggests a new perspective on 
the law, which inevitably upsets some conventional wisdom. It thus points 
to possible improvements to the law as well as to new questions that offer a 
research agenda for future reformers and scholars. 
Indeed, as Rawls noted, interpretive theories aim at both understanding an 
existing practice and directing its evolution. Accordingly, they need to distin-
guish between "core" features of the practice, which serve as fixed points to 
which a theory must fit, and other features that can be treated with less 
deference and are thus reexamined and potentially reformed in light of the 
theory.23 
Existing theories of contract law indeed make such distinctions (explicitly 
or implicitly), treating, for example, the expectation measure of recovery or 
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the consideration requirement as contract's doctrinal core.24 However, these 
choices are by no means obvious: consideration, for example, is not even a 
necessary, let alone core, characteristic of contract in most Continental juris-
dictions.25 Furthermore, looking for a rule that runs through the various 
contract types already presupposes the flattening Willistonian view of contract 
as a shapeless unified form. 
Therefore, our choice of core is different in kind: choice theory focuses 
exactly on what the now-conventional view obscures - the multiplicity of 
contract types that typifies actual contract law. We present this multiplicity in 
its best light by highlighting its autonomy-enhancing function. As with any 
other interpretive theory, we cannot expect our interpretation to explain every 
extant feature of the law. But the gaps that choice theory reveals are useful: 
they help focus attention on whether and why the law doesn't live up to its 
own (implicit) ideals.26 
What first appears as a blemish on the law turns out to be the most 
important takeaway of choice the01y - the relative paucity of types in the 
realms of family, work, and home compared with the sphere of commerce, 
and the state's obligations in response. 
2 . On Deciding and Thinking . Putting multiplicity front and center raises a 
second methodological conundrum. If the differences among contract types 
are as significant as we claim, does that then imply that "contract" is not an 
important overarching categ01y, which in tum means that there cannot be a 
general theory of contract law? 
No. A general theory is possible if we keep in mind the distinction between 
categories for deciding and categories for thinking.27 Choice the01y does imply 
that the normative concerns underlying conb:act types are so diverse that 
simply labeling something as "contract" is not enough to justify any concrete 
reform consequence. In other words, we cannot justify treating contract as a 
category for deciding. 
Nevertheless, this does not eliminate the significance of contract as a 
doctrinal category. Quite the contrary. While normative concerns differ 
among types, there are enough structural similarities that "contract" is still a 
useful categ01y for thinking. For example, because all contract types must be 
voluntary - given our fundamental commitment to autonomy as contract's 
(one) ultimate value - securing voluntariness is a common challenge of 
otherwise heterogeneous types. Thinking about the proper means for facing 
this challenge across contract types may be helpful even if we conclude, as we 
do in Chapter 8, that it is best handled by prescribing distinct doctrinal tools 
tailored to the normative valences of particular contract types. 
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Further, the underlying values animating diverse contract types do overlap: 
they all aim at securing the instrumental and intrinsic goods of contract -
primarily utility and community - while securing autonomy, always as the 
ultimate value and sometimes as a side-constraint (distinctions we set out in 
Chapters 4 and 7). This overlap ensures that reflecting on the variety of 
contract types is likely to yield some useful cross-fertilization and that, in turn, 
justifies studying them together and treating them as the subject matter of 
unified scholarly analysis. 
Finally, appreciating the common function of all contract types in the 
service of people's autonomy is crucial because it implies that, for evety sphere 
of potential contracting activity, the state should provide a robust menu of 
choices. It also implies that a liberal state must develop a category of "residual 
contracting" for people who prefer to reject contract law's favored forms of 
interaction (a category that may look quite different from the "general" 
contract law of existing theory).28 Freedom to choose among types can and 
does sit comfmtably alongside the freedom to dicker over terms. 
3· On Theory and Practice. As our title indicates and the text will confirm, this 
is primarily a book in contract law theory. The front half criticizes existing 
approaches; the back half offers an alternative. Our goal, though, is not just 
better theory but also better practice. 
We advance an innovative conception of contracts because we believe that 
adopting choice theory and implementing its reform agenda will enhance the 
self-determination of real people in the real world. Demonstrating a viable 
path from theory to practice is, therefore, crucial. Otherwise, choice theory is 
just a happy fantasy. Indeed, we suspect that some readers may become 
impatient with questions of implementation even in reading this Introduction. 
As we see it, these concerns come in two main forms: substantive and 
institutional. Substantively, critics may worry that our call for multiplicity of 
contract types will overlook the limits and drawbacks of choice. What if more 
choice reduces freedom? Institutionally, critics may be concerned that our 
references to "contract law'' doing this or that means \Ve believe that the 
disembodied "law" is somehow the agent that should offer contract types or 
facilitate choice within spheres. Are there actual legal institutions sufficiently 
competent to implement choice theory? 
These are legitimate challenges for anyone concerned with putting choice 
theory into practice. We postpone our reply to Chapter 12, not because the 
challenges are unimportant, but because a reply requires that we fiJ,"st set out 
the contours of choice theory. On the substantive side, we identify a range 
of cognitive, behavioral, structural, and political economy concerns about 
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expanding choice. We offer this list as a research agenda for interdisciplinary 
scholars interested in implementing choice theory. 
Regarding the institutional challenge, we can sketch out some more prac-
tical steps. For example, in the sphere of commerce, we often see market 
demand driving the creation of new business contract types. Sophisticated 
commercial parties are likely to be the best type-developers in this sphere. 
They share a wealth-maximizing metric for evaluating terms and they are 
motivated to do a good design job because they can directly capture much of 
the surplus they generate. 
Challenges arise when the pa1ties' overriding goal moves away from wealth 
maximization. Then, there is less reason to expect market demand to drive 
creation of sufficient types. Implementing choice theory thus devolves into a 
study of comparative institutional competence of actors including state legis-
latures and judges, the American Law Institute (ALI) and the Uniform Law 
Commission (NCCUSL), along with public interest groups, law firms, and 
lobbyists. 
One approach is to encourage states to adopt successful types from other 
states or countries (we give examples of this "comparative" strategy). Another is 
to encourage them to support rather than squash emerging and utopian types 
for which there is already some level of demand (the "experimental" strategy). 
Institutions such as the ALI or NCCUSL may be able to refine innovative 
types, say for cohabitation, civil unions, "dependent contractors," and so on 
(the "incremental" strategy). We aren't arguing that any of these institutions 
should initiate new contract types from scratch. How would they pick? Our 
thoughts in this section are admittedly preliminary because full answers will 
inevitably be linked to a particular contract type or a specific state or national 
institutional design. 
Thus, our argument in Chapter 12 about putting choice theory into practice 
is somewhat modest, but nonetheless crucial. Most important, we rule out 
the (devastating) possibility that substantive and institutional criticisms are 
all-encompassing, and show instead that they are local to particular contract 
types or institutional settings. There is room to implement choice themy such 
that contract law does a better job than the status quo in enhancing people's 
self-determination. 
A BRIEF ROADMAP 
Part I examines the contributions and limits of prior autonomy-based contract 
theories. We show why Fried's approach to contractual autonomy cannot 
work and why all the later rights-based versions from promise theory to transfer 
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theory fare no better. Nevertheless, we argue that autonomy, understood as 
self-determination, is still the ultimate value of contract. Much of the work 
here is heavy-duty jurisprudence - we aim for brevity while trying to provide 
enough detail to persuade the specialists. 
Part II explores the main goods people seek from contracting. People 
generally do not enter contracts to become freer, although autonomy does 
function as an important side-constraint. The main goods of contract are 
utility and community, as we define the terms. We show why neither good 
works alone as the ultimate contract value, but both are essential to any 
complete theory of the field. 
Part III sets out choice theory and shows how contract law plays a positive, 
active, and previously underappreciated autonomy-enhancing role. We start 
by developing a more tailored view of autonomy for contract and show how 
that value relates to utility and community. Values in conflict are the toughest 
challenges, and we show how to resolve them. Then we spell out how those 
values relate to contract spheres and types - refining choice theory along the 
way, answering potential objections that it generates, and showing how it 
resolves many doctrinal puzzles. 
Our Conclusion sketches some of the challenges choice theory must face 
and the research agenda that it generates as we move beyond Williston and 
Fried . Choice theory shows that contract law matters even more to freedom 
than has previously been understood. 
* * * 
Choice theory has several virtues. It offers a normatively attractive view of 
freedom through contract law. It provides the first conceptually coherent 
account of core contract values and their interrelationships. And finally, 
choice theory marks a path for reform that brings contract law closer to widely 
shared liberal ideals . 
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